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Refining the Reasonable Apprehension of
Bias Test: Providing Judges Better Tools
for Addressing Judicial Disqualification

Despite a considerable amount of litigation concerning judicial impartiality, the
Canadian "reasonable apprehension of bias" test for judicial disqualification has
remained fundamentally unaltered and is well accepted in the jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, the application of the test continues to generate difficulties
for judges who need to use it to make decisions in marginal cases. Based on
previously published doctrinal and empirical research, the goal in the present
contribution is to suggest modifications to the test that will better explain the
existing jurisprudence and make it easier for judges to understand when recusal
is or is not necessary in marginal cases. The authors consider first the advantages
of the existing test and suggest that in order to be useful, any refinement to the
test must, to the greatest extent possible, preserve those advantages. Second,
the authors explain why inconsistent application of the test in marginal cases
is a concern. Third, they analyze the ways in which the existing test, and the
jurisprudence explaining and applying it, are problematic. Fourth, the authors
propose a modification to the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test that is
designed to address these shortcomings while preserving the key advantages
of the existing test.
Malgrd les nombreux litiges concernant l'impartialitd du pouvoir judiciaire,
le critbre canadien de la crainte raisonnable de partialit6 pour d6terminer
l'inhabilitd en matibre judiciaire est rest6 fondamentalement intact et acceptd
dans la jurisprudence. Malheureusement, Iapplication du critbre continue !
pr6senter des difficultds pour les juges qui doivent l'utiliser pour prendre des
d6cisions dans des cas marginaux. Cet article, qui s'appuie sur la recherche
dans la jurisprudence et la recherche empirique, a pour objectif de suggerer des
modifications au critbre, modifications qui expliqueront mieux la jurisprudence
existante et faciliteront la tche aux juges qui doivent d6cider s'il y a lieu de se
r~cuser dans des cas marginaux. Les auteurs examinent d'abord les avantages
du critbre actuel et avancent que pour 6tre utile, toute prdcision qui y serait
apportde doit, dans toute la mesure du possible, preserver ces avantages. Les
auteurs expliquent ensuite pourquoi l'application non uniforme du crit're dans
les cas marginaux est prdoccupante. Troisibmement, ils analysent les motifs qui
font que le critbre existant de mdme que la jurisprudence utilisde pour Iexpliquer
et l'appliquer sont problmatiques. Ouatribmement, les auteurs proposent une
modification au critbre de crainte raisonnable de partialit6 conque pour corriger
ces lacunes tout en pr6servant les principaux avantages du critbre existant.
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Introduction
The "reasonable apprehension of bias" test forjudicial disqualification has
been a fixture of Canadian law for many years, at a minimum since its
formulation in the National Energy Boardcase in 1978.' By that time, the
Supreme Court of Canada was able to draw on a long history of Canadian
and other common law precedents in support of identically or similarly
framed tests for determining judicial impartiality. Despite a considerable
amount of litigation concerning judicial impartiality since that time, the
test itself has remained fundamentally unaltered and is well accepted in
the jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the application of the test continues to
generate difficulties for judges who need to use it to make decisions in
marginal cases.Our experience as facilitators in judicial education seminars over the
years led us to believe that judges often have very different views about
how the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test should be applied. In
particular, we noticed that even when the case law indicated that it was not
necessary for a judge to recuse himself or herself in a particular situation,
1. Committeefor Justice and Liberty etalv National Energy Boardet al, [1978] 1 SCR 369 at 394
[National Energy Board]. It is worth noting that the National Energy Board case itself did not involve
the disqualification of a judge but the disqualification of a member of an administrative tribunal. The
Nation Energy Board test is, however, employed in the leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions
involving challenges to the impartiality of judges. See, for example, Wewaykum Indian Band v
Canada,2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 SCR 259 at para 60 [Wewaykum]; R v RDS, [1997] 3 SCR 484 at para
31, per L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ; and para 111,per Cory J.
2.
Lome Sossin has observed that "[t]he law in Canada relating to judicial bias is at once clear
and unsettled. It is clear because for purposes both of legal and ethical accountability, the standard of
impartiality which has been adopted, that of reasonable apprehension of bias, has found widespread
acceptance. It is unsettled because the application of that standard remains very much in flux":
"Judges, Bias and Recusal in Canada" in Hoong Phun Lee, ed, Judiciariesin ComparativePerspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 301 at 321.
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it was quite common for judges participating in seminars to suggest that
the application of the general reasonable apprehension of bias test would
lead them to a different conclusion. We hypothesized that these differences
of opinion might not appear in the reported case law because in many
instances judges recuse themselves of their own motion, with the result
that the case law significantly under-reports the incidence of recusal. With
the assistance of the Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges, we
sought to develop a better understanding of howjudges think about recusal
and disqualification by conducting a survey of 137 Canadian provincial
and territorial judges concerning their experience of and attitudes toward
recusal in analytically marginal cases.
The results of the survey, which were published in the Alberta Law
Review in 2011, tended to confirm our suspicions.' The judges we surveyed
reported that it was reasonably common for them to recuse themselves:
two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they would recuse themselves
between one and five times in a typical year and a further nineteen per
cent indicated that they would recuse themselves more often than this in a
typical year.4 By far the most common practice was for the judge to recuse
of his or her own motion, with the typical result that no written record
was made of the judge's reasons for taking this decision.' Moreover, we
found a significant degree of variation in the judges' responses to the
scenarios we posed,6 which suggested to us that even though judges are
very familiar with the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test, it is not very
helpful as a way of developing a common understanding of how marginal
disqualification cases ought to be resolved. Our goal in the present paper
is to suggest modifications to the test that will better explain the existing
jurisprudence and make it easier for judges to understand when recusal is
or is not necessary in marginal cases.
We begin by looking at the reasons, both doctrinal and practical, why
the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test is so widely accepted. These
reasons are compelling. To be useful, any refinement to the test must, to
the greatest extent possible, preserve the considerable advantages of the
existing test. In the second part of the paper we consider why inconsistent
application of the test in marginal cases is a concern. This is followed by a
more detailed consideration of the ways in which the existing test, and the
3.
Philip Bryden & Jula Hughes, "The Tip of the Iceberg: A Survey of the Philosophy and Practice
of Canadian Provincial and Territorial Judges Concerning Judicial Disqualification" (2011) 48 Alta L
Rev 569 [Bryden & Hughes, "Tip of the Iceberg"].
Ibid at 576-577.
4.
5. Ibid at 577.
6.
Ibid at 579-582.
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jurisprudence explaining and applying it, are problematic. The fourth part
of the paper proposes a modification to the "reasonable apprehension of
bias" test that is designed to address these shortcomings while preserving
the key advantages of the existing test.
I.

Why do we have the test we currently use? Principledandpractical
advantages and disadvantages
In departure from English law, Canadian and Australian courts use a
unified "reasonable apprehension of bias" test to determine all cases of
disqualification.' Courts in England and New Zealand use a bifurcated
test. In the English test, a distinction is drawn between situations in
which disqualification is automatic and situations in which a reasonable
apprehension of bias test is employed." However, the difference between
the Canadian and English approaches is more one of methodology in
the reasoning process than tests that produce fundamentally different
results. Cases that result in automatic disqualification in England would
normally also result in disqualification in Canada using the reasonable
apprehension of bias test. The two approaches have grown closer together
more recently, as over the past decade English courts have made it
clear that the "apprehension of bias" branch of the test in England is a
"reasonable" apprehension of bias, rather than a more relaxed standard for
the assessment of judicial impartiality.'
The Canadian test focuses on the perceptions of a reasonable person
rather than on the presence or absence of actual bias. There are several
reasons, both principled and practical, for the approach Canadian law
has taken to the question of whether or not a decision-maker is impartial.
The principled reasons include related concerns over the legitimacy of
outcomes, the credibility of the judicial process, and the desirability of
voluntary compliance with judicial decisions. The practical concerns
relate to difficulties of proof of actual bias.

7.
See Wewaykum, supra note I at paras 69-73; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, (2000)
176 ALR 644 (Aust HC); R v Webb (1994), 122 ALR 41 (Aust HC). See also Philip Bryden, "Legal
Principles Governing the Disqualification of Judges" (2003) 83 Can Bar Rev 556 at 558-563 [Bryden,
"Legal Principles"]; Andrew Field, "Confirming the Parting of Ways: The Law of Bias and the
Automatic Disqualification Rule in England and Australia" (2001) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies
388.
8. See R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2), [2000]
1 AC 119 (HL) [Pinochet]; Porterv Magill, [2002] AC 357 (HLE); Muir v Commissioner of Inland
Revenue, [2007] NZCA 334, [2007] 3 NZLR 495; Michael Taggart, "Administrative Law" (2003)
New Zealand Law Review 99 at 99-104.
9.
See Porterv Magill, supranote 8; Helow v SecretaryofState for the Home Department, [2008]
UKHL 62, 2008 SCLR 830 (HL).
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From the standpoint of principle, it is important to us that our systems
of adjudication (whether administrative or judicial) have public credibility.
This credibility starts with the litigants in question, but goes far beyond to
include the citizenry in general. Judicial and other adjudicative processes
that are not publicly credible not only undermine the acceptability of the
immediate outcome of a case, but also operate to diminish the reputation
of the justice system as a whole. A chief component of public credibility
is not merely the actual but also the perceived impartiality of judges and
adjudicators.
This concern with the repute ofthejustice system must include concerns
over the process by which we decide on challenges to impartiality. If our
rules forjudicial disqualification were to focus on the actual impartiality of
the decision-maker, the awkward process of attacking and then attempting
to shore up the reputation of the decision-maker in proceedings where a
party challenges the impartiality of the decision-maker is likely to damage
the public perception of the legal system. This is true even if the challenge
itself ultimately fails.
Additionally, the efficacy of our system of law is built very heavily on
voluntary compliance with the decisions of courts and tribunals. Because
we believe that the likelihood of voluntary compliance is enhanced by the
perception that our legal system is a fair one, it is important to us that the
parties to proceedings, and the public more generally, perceive that our
decision-makers are impartial.
Finally, it bears remembering that our system of adjudication is built
on notions of public justice. Not infrequently, issues of partiality will
be tied up with concerns over lack of transparency or accountability.
Similarly, some of the chief guarantees of'judicial impartiality are closely
linked to the public nature of our justice system: judicial independence,
constitutional guarantees, and public funding.10 It seems appropriate that a
system of public justice should concern itself with objectively manifested
impartiality, and not merely with the question of whether a particular
decision-maker in fact kept an open mind.
From a practical perspective there are attractions to concentrating on a
reasonable perception of bias rather than demanding proof of actual bias. It
is often difficult to draw conclusions about a decision-maker's subjective
willingness to be open-minded on the basis of his or her actions or words.
For someone wishing to challenge the impartiality of a decision-maker,
10. See, for example, R v Campbell, [1997] 3 SCR 3 at para 10, in which Chief Justice Lamer
referred to "public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary" as something "essential to the
effectiveness of the court system."
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attempting to demonstrate that the decision-maker is actually biased,
even on an evidentiary standard of the balance of probabilities, raises
extraordinary problems of proof. Equally, the ability of a person seeking
to uphold a decision to show that the decision-maker was impartial is
inhibited by the usual difficulties inherent in proving a negative (absence of
bias). In addition, both a party seeking to challenge a decision on the basis
of the judge's actual bias and a party seeking to uphold the decision in the
face of such a challenge are inhibited by the restrictions the law places on
the judge's capacity as a witness." Thus, the "reasonable apprehension of
bias" standard has a practical appeal both to those who want to challenge
the impartiality of decision-makers and to those who wish to resist such
challenges.
II. Why should we care about variabilityin the applicationof the
reasonableapprehensionof bias test?
A person who was skeptical about modifying the "reasonable apprehension
of bias" test might well argue that there is nothing special about judges
having differences of opinion in marginal cases. What makes a case
marginal, after all, is our ability to make plausible arguments for or against
a particular result. The use of a "reasonableness" standard implies a
requirement that a range of considerations will come into play in different
contexts, and over time the common law method has allowed judges using
the "reasonableness" standard to develop a coherent jurisprudence in a
variety of different areas of the law.12 Why, the skeptic might ask, should
the law with respect to judicial impartiality be any different?
We offer two responses to the skeptic's query. One is to observe that
refinement of the tests judges use to make decisions is an important part of
the common law method. Ifwe are able to refine the reasonable apprehension
of bias test in a manner that helps to explain the jurisprudence, and make
it more coherent and easier for judges to apply consistently, even a skeptic
ought to agree that the effort is worthwhile. We would argue that the level
of disagreement among judges concerning the application of the test in
marginal cases that we have identified suggests that there is considerable
room for improvement. We acknowledge that we still need to demonstrate

11. See Geoffrey Lester, "Disqualifying Judges for Bias and Reasonable Apprehension of Bias:
Some Problems of Practice and Procedure" (2001) 24 Advocates Q 326 [Lester, "Disqualifying
Judges"]. As Mr. Lester observes, judges can, and occasionally do, make statements about the facts
that are relevant to a disqualification application, but they cannot give evidence and are not subject to
cross-examination.
12. Familiar examples include the reasonable person standard of care in negligence law and the
reasonable person standard in the law of self-defence in criminal law. See, for example, Arland v
Taylor, [1955] OR 131 (CA); R v Cinous, [2002] 2 SCR 3; and R vLavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852.
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to the skeptic that we have succeeded in our attempt to improve upon the
"reasonable apprehension of bias" test.
The second response is that disagreements about whether judges
should or should not recuse themselves have a meaningful impact on
the administration of justice, and any improvement we can offer in this
area will benefit both the judges and the members of the public who use
our court system. The point of departure for this argument is that recusal
is sufficiently frequent to have an impact on the effective and efficient
administration of justice. As we noted above, in "Tip of the Iceberg," twothirds of our respondents indicated that they would recuse themselves
between one and five times in a typical year. Another nineteen per cent
reported recusing more than five times a year. Only fourteen per cent
indicated that they would not recuse themselves at all in a typical year."
The reported case law on recusal, while extensive, does not begin to
reflect the actual scope of recusal as the vast majority of recusal decisions
are made by judges on their own motion. This was true for the respondents
to our survey,14 and judging from comments of participants at judicial
education seminars, it is true for judges at all levels of Canadian courts. It
is difficult to estimate the global impact of recusal on the administration
of justice as the degree of disruption to the work schedule of the court
will vary depending on the stage in the proceedings at which recusal takes
place, the context in which the judge works, and the particularities of the
case. The same factors will influence the extent to which recusal has an
impact on the parties. In most instances a decision not to sit taken prior to
the docket being finalized has a very different impact on the parties than
a decision to recuse half-way through a trial. The practical consequences
for the parties of the recusal of the sole judge in a small town or a judge
on circuit are likely to be different than the impact of recusal by a judge
in a major centre. The inherent delay that attends many recusal decisions
may affect one party more than the other. Similarly, delay in some types
of proceedings may have more serious consequences for the parties than
in other situations.
Our research also suggests that judges recuse in some marginal
situations where jurisprudence and/or policy would suggest that they
should not recuse.11 This may be because judges are apprehensive about
appellate treatment or because they do not wish to sit when a party has

13.
14.
15.

Bryden & Hughes, "Tip of the Iceberg," supra note 3 at 576-577.
Ibid at 572.
Ibid at 584-585 and 604-608.

178 The Dalhousie Law Journal

expressed a lack of confidence in their impartiality.'I Our research further
indicates that certain types of situations are subject to a great deal of
uncertainty and disagreement between judges." Greater clarity would
likely promote efficiency by avoiding unnecessary recusals. It would also
enhance the transparency of judicial practice with respect to recusal and
would encourage consistency.
III. Problems with the existing test
The chief problem with the reasonable apprehension of bias test is that
it is does not provide an adequate acknowledgement that courts balance
considerations of the effective administration of justice against a party's
perception that the judge's impartiality is compromised by his or her
relationship with one of the participants in the litigation." We argue that
the results of the jurisprudence are best explained by recognizing that
balancing of these considerations actually takes place, but the reasoning in
the cases in which we observe the phenomenon is rarely explicit in taking
the effective administration of justice into account. Our assumption is
that judges are reluctant to refer explicitly to the desirability of balancing
considerations of the effective administration of justice for two reasons.
The first is that the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test has such a
long pedigree that judges are reluctant to modify it, and as it is presently
constructed there is no reference to balancing considerations.'0 The second
is that the balancing of considerations of the effective administration of

16. There is a significant strand of American thinking on judicial disqualification that favours
peremptory challenges where a party subjectively believes that a judge will not be impartial. See
Charles Geyh, "Draft Report of the ABA Judicial Disqualification Project" (2008), online: <http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/judicial independence/jdp geyhreport.
authcheckdam.pdf> at 60-65; James Sample & Michael Young, "Invigorating Judicial Disqualification:
Ten Potential Reforms" (2008) 92 Judicature 26 at 27-28; Debra Lyn Bassett, "Judicial Disqualification
in the Federal Appellate Courts" (2002) 87 Iowa Law Review 1213 at 1224 and 1251-1256; Richard
Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusals and Disqualification of Judges, 2d ed (Berkeley, CA:
Banks and Jordan Law, 2007) at § 26.1.
17. Bryden & Hughes, "Tip of the Iceberg," supra note 3 at 579-582.
18. The most common situations in which these concerns arise is where the judge has a social
relationship with a party or counsel or, less frequently, with a witness, or where the judge has had
previous interactions with one or more of the parties in ajudicial setting, what we like to refer to as the
"repeat customer" phenomenon.
19. The current test is taken from the reasoning of Justice DeGrandpr6, dissenting, in the National
Energy Board case, supra note 1. As endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum, supra
note I at para 60, it is:
... the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right
minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required
information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is "what would an informed
person, viewing the matter realistically and practically--and having thought the matter'
through-conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decisionmaker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.
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justice in disqualification cases tends to highlight the practical limitations
of our court system to actually deliver the type of justice that litigants
might prefer to receive. 20
Courts commonly employ two devices to justify the rejection of
arguments that a judge should be disqualified using an objective standard
of reasonableness. The first is an emphasis on the fact-specific nature of
the application of the test, and the second is an attribution of certain insider
knowledge or characteristics to the "reasonable person." Neither approach,
in our respectful view, is entirely satisfactory.
As an example of the first device, in its 2003 decision in Wewaykum
Indian Band v Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that the
application of the reasonable apprehension of bias test is "highly fact
specific." In the Court's words:
Whether the facts, as established, point to financial or personal interest
of the decision-maker; present or past link with a party, counsel or judge;
earlier participation or knowledge of the litigation; or expression of
views and activities, they must be addressed carefully in light of the
entire context. There are no shortcuts. 2 '
The idea that judges should pay attention to the entire context in deciding
whether or not recusal or disqualification is warranted is not inherently
problematic, but it offers little or no guidance to judges in deciding what
weight to give the relevant considerations or even what facts or contextual
factors are relevant. This generates a broad area of discretion. Again, that
would not necessarily be problematic, but there are reasons to believe that
the exercise of the discretion will be influenced, sometimes strongly, by
extraneous considerations that would favour recusal, in situations where
the jurisprudence and a principled consideration of the merits would
favour the opposite conclusion.
In our experience, judges perceive the consequences of making what is
subsequently determined to be an incorrect decision to hear a case as much
more serious than the consequences of recusal in a situation where this is
not strictly speaking necessary. Judges rightly believe that impartiality, and
the reputation for impartiality, are core characteristics ofjudicial office as

20. Courts are much less reluctant to recognize the inherent limitations on impartiality that flow from
the adjudicative systems legislatures have chosen when discussing impartiality in the administrative
justice context. See, for example, Newfoundland Telephone Co v Newfoundland (Board of
CommissionersofPublic Utilities), [ 1992] 1 SCR 623; Save Richmond FarmlandSociety v Richmond
(Township), [1990] 3 SCR 1213.
21. Wewaykum, supra note I at para 77.
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well as constitutional imperatives.22 In the absence of a strong consensus
surrounding when recusal is warranted in marginal situations, there are
strong incentives for judges to be risk averse when they find themselves
faced with such situations.
The device of imputing insider knowledge to the reasonable person has
become a relatively common means for courts to justify their conclusion
that recusal or disqualification is not warranted in a particular context. In
many instances, however, it cannot help but appear that the sensibilities of
the judge making the determination play a very significant role, at least in
marginal cases. This has two unfortunate consequences. The first is that
because judges are required in the first instance to rule on challenges to
their impartiality, a party who has unsuccessfully challenged the judge's
impartiality is forced to accept what appears to be the highly subjective
assessment of a judge whose impartiality, at least in the eyes of that party,
is already suspect.24 One of the virtues of the "reasonable apprehension of
bias test" is that it is designed to focus attention away from a subjective
assessment of the judge's impartiality and towards an objective assessment
of the judge's impartiality. If the legal construction of the reasonable
observer is perceived to be highly subjective much of the value of the test
is compromised-if not lost entirely. 25
The other unfortunate consequence is that a party who makes an
unsuccessful challenge to a judge's impartiality is implicitly portrayed as
22. The Canadian Judicial Council's guide to judges on ethical behavior, Ethical Principlesfor
Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998) states at 30 that "[i]mpartiality is the fundamental
qualification of ajudge and the core attribute of the judiciary," an observation endorsed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Wewaykum, supranote I at para 59.
23. A number of American commentators suggest that judges in that country are overly reluctant
to disqualify themselves using the "apparent bias" test for disqualification because they believe
that willingness to accede to disqualification applications would undermine public confidence in
the administration of justice. See, for example, the ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, "Taking
Disqualification Seriously" (2008) 92 Judicature 12 at 16-17; John Leubsdorf, "Theories of Judging
and Judicial Disqualification" (1987) 62 NYUL Rev 237 at 245-252.
24. Charles Geyh, author of the Report of the ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supranote 15
at 65-68, identifies the current practice that judges adjudicate disqualification motions themselves as
one that raises serious problems and the Report encourages states to adopt rules assigning contested
disqualification motions to a different judge. See also Sample & Young, supranote 16 at 30-32; Leslie
Abramson, "Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?" (1994) 28 Valparaiso UL Rev 543
at 559-560; Hon Grant Hammond, JudicialRecusal: Principles,Process and Problems (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2009) at 82-84; Hon Anthony Mason, "Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended
Bias and the Problem of Appellate Review" (1998) 1 Cons L & Pol Rev 21 at 25-26.
25. As law teachers we have often noticed the level of discomfort our students experience in
discussing cases such as National Energy Board and R v RDS, supra note 1, in which members of the
Supreme Court of Canada disagree on the application of the "reasonable application of bias" test to the
facts of the case before them. We suspect that in these instances our students are reflecting a preference
as citizens for an ideal ofjustice in which the meaning of core concepts such as judicial impartiality is
universally understood and accepted.
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unreasonable. The same unfortunate consequence befalls a judge whose
decision that the law did not disqualify him or her from sitting is set aside
on appeal. No doubt there will be situations in which this is in fact the case,
but as our research has suggested, there are many marginal cases in which
reasonable judges will disagree about whether recusal or disqualification
is warranted. As a matter of law, we have to draw boundaries between
marginal situations in which judges are disqualified and ones in which
they are able to adjudicate. In our view, it does not serve the interests of
justice to rub salt into the wounds of either a litigant whose sincere, albeit
unsuccessful, challenge to the impartiality of a judge must be rejected, or
the judge whose possibly reasonable but incorrect conclusion must be set
aside on appeal.26
Reliance on the assumed insider knowledge or characteristics of
the "reasonable person" as a way of distinguishing successful from
unsuccessful challenges to a judge's impartiality fails to articulate a
number of factors that, based on our research, tend to influence recusal
decisions in marginal cases. For example, judicial decisions concerning
recusal and disqualification rarely identify concern over the impact of
recusal on the parties or the administration ofjustice as an explicit basis for
concluding that disqualification is inappropriate. Despite this, we would
argue that the judges' conception of judicial impartiality and their beliefs
about the best way to reconcile this ideal with the competing practical
realities of effectively administering a system ofjustice are likely frequent
determinants in recusal decisions. Yet these competing factors, or even the
idea that these factors might be in competition with impartiality concerns,
are not flagged in the test and are, consequently, almost never expressed in
recusal or disqualification decisions.
There are exceptions. It is possible to find some decisions in which
judges have explicitly acknowledged the practical consequences for the
administration of justice of accepting a party's submission that it would
be better if the matter were heard by a different judge. In Newfoundland

26. Appellate courts typically do not defer to first instance judges either in respect of their assessment
of the relevant legal principles governing judicial disqualification or in the application of those
principles to the facts before them. See (DA v M(TB), 2011 YKCA 8 at para 40; Barrett v Glynn, 2001
NFCA 70 at paras 63-65. Thus, appellate courts are not concluding that a judge's incorrect decision to
sit in a situation in which the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test has been met is "unreasonable" in
the sense in which that term is used in administrative law. See New Brunswick (Board ofManagement)
v Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 44-50. Nevertheless, the fact that the test itself invites an assessment
of the judge's perceived impartiality from the perspective of "reasonable and right minded persons"
(see the relevant passage from National Energy Board quoted above at note 18) has the unfortunate
rhetorical effect of suggesting that persons who make assessments that prove to be incorrect are not
being reasonable.
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andLabrador (Directorof Child, Youth and Family Services) v Thorne,27
for example, Judge Porter dealt with an application that he should recuse
himself made by the father of the children affected by a child protection
matter. The basis for the application was that there was a reasonable
apprehension of bias because Judge Porter had heard two bail hearings
and sentencing submissions in relation to two criminal offences to which
the applicant had plead guilty. One involved a threat to kill the applicant's
former spouse. In the course of his reasons for denying the application,
Judge Porter observed: "as a practical matter, if a Judge presiding in a rural
judicial district might be disqualified from hearing more than one or two
matters relating to any one individual, then she or he would soon find her
or him self unable to hear anything."2 Judge Porter also took into account
the issues of delay and inconvenience to the mother of the children, who
objected to the application, 29 and the possibility that the application was
motivated by tactical considerations.3 0
Regrettably, the type of candid assessment offered by Judge Porter of
the role that considerations of the effective administration ofjustice played
on his decision not to recuse himself in the Thorne case are extremely
rare. It is more common for judges to introduce these considerations
indirectly through the mechanism of imbuing the reasonable person with
internal knowledge of the workings of the courts. A somewhat extreme
example of an insider perspective attributed to the reasonable person
emerges in Wewaykum.3 ' In justifying why the judgment should not be
vacated, the Supreme Court relied on a distinction, ostensibly understood
by the reasonable person, between lawyers in private practice and lawyers
engaged in government or legal aid work. 2 Even more surprisingly, this
reasonable person is also aware of the inner workings of the deliberations
of the Court prior to releasing judgments." This insider perspective
allows for consideration of important countervailing concerns such as
efficiency and, in Wewaykum, the value of procedural certainty following
a judgment. It undermines the integrity of the test, however, which is
27. [2007] NJ No 414 (QL) 2007, CanLIl 52943 (NL PC) [Thorne].
28. Ibid at para 5.
29. Ibid at paras 4 and 6.
30. Ibid at paras 14-17.
31. Wewaykum, supra note 1.
32. On the latter point, see Adam Dodek, "Constitutional Legitimacy and Responsibility: Confronting
Allegations of Bias After Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada"(2004) 25 SCLR (2d) 165 at 174. For
other examples of reliance on an "insider" perspective of the operation of the legal system in judicial
disqualification cases, see Taylor v Lawrence, [2003] 3 WLR 640 (Eng CA) at paras 61-63; President
ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa v South African Rugby Football Union, [1999] 4 SA147 (SA Const Ct)
at para 84.
33. Wewaykum, supra note 1 at para 92.
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supposed to focus on the reputational interest of the justice system-an
interest that must be seen from an outsider's point of view. A number of
judges in England and New Zealand have expressed concern that courts
should not attribute knowledge to the "reasonable observer" that would
not be shared by members of the general public. In the words of Justice
McGrath in Saxmere (No 1): "attributing knowledge of information to the
hypothetical observer may transform the process from one of ascertaining
the perception of a member of the general public, so that it becomes that
of an insider in the legal world."34
Sensitivity to these competing concerns appears to be related to the
perceived frequency of the scenarios that give rise to the possibility of
recusal. 5 The strict stance courts across the common law world take
regarding financial interests appears to be more rooted in the relative
rarity of direct financial interests of judges in the success of litigants than
in a deep concern over partiality. 6 Our research similarly suggests that
judges in rural areas are substantially less likely to recuse than judges
sitting in large urban centres where the bias issue relates to professional
relationships.3 7 The relative size of the professional community (and thus,
the increased frequency of the problem) combined with the difficulty
of finding a replacement for a judge who has recused (causing a higher
impact on the efficient administration of justice) leads to the competing,
but hidden, factors significantly affecting the decision to recuse.
A final doctrinal difficulty with the existing test relates to exceptions.
There are two known mechanisms for overcoming a bias objection after

34. Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board DisestablishmentCo Ltd (No 1) (Saxmere No 1), [20091
NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 at para 97.
35. In an article entitled "Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality" (2002) 22 Legal Studies 53 at 62, Kate
Malleson suggests that the guidelines laid out by the English Court of Appeal in Locabail (UK) Ltd v
Bayfield PropertiesLtd, [2000] 1All ER 65 (Eng CA) "are an essentially pragmatic attempt to protect
the efficient operation of the court system over a purist application of the Hewart principle of justice
[referring to Lord Hewart's observation that 'justice... should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done']. The fact that the construction of the categories has very little theoretical or empirical
grounding is therefore not accidental nor the result of an inexplicable intellectual failure on the part
of three of the most capable judges in the country. The construction of this list should be seen as a
statement of policy rather than fact. In excluding background and personal origins, the court was
seeking to limit to a bare minimum the damage that would arise to the running of the courts and the
confidence in their fairness from frequent challenges. The gaps and inconsistencies of the Locabail
guidelines suggest that they should be read as a signal to close the floodgates rather than an attempt
to provide an internally or externally consistent framework for identifying the circumstances in which
bias might arise."
36. See Bryden, "Legal Principles," supranote 7 at 574-579.
37. See Bryden & Hughes, "Tip of the Iceberg," supra note 3 at 597-599.
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a reasonable apprehension of bias has been found: waiver and necessity."
Both pose certain problems. Waiver sits somewhat uneasily with the
objective focus of the reasonable apprehension of bias test because it
seems to permit litigants to prefer their own view of whether a judge
should be able to hear a case over that of the reasonable person. Equally,
and assuming no recourse to notions of adjudicative efficiency, where a
party seeks to deal with a bias problem on appeal, it seems difficult to
justify why a litigant should have to live with their first instance decision
not to raise a bias issue. This is particularly problematic given that the
litigant may well think that raising the issue in a marginal case will further
jeopardize their rapport with the judge. 9 It is from the perspective of the
appearance of justice that the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected
the application of the waiver doctrine in a case of political interference
and cautioned that:
courts must approach the waiver issue with caution when dealing with
allegations of bias. The categories of bias are diverse and each category
should be looked at individually with a view to ensuring that the public
confidence in the integrity of the tribunal decision-making process is
preserved.
As the policy justification for the rule against biased decision-making
is the public's loss of confidence in the administration of justice, this
policy justification outweighs a party's right to expect legal issues to
be raised in a timely manner. In my view, this is a proper case for the
court to exercise its residual discretion to deal with the merits of the bias
allegation, notwithstanding the application of the waiver doctrine.4 0
Further, waiver may reintroduce an actual bias branch of the test through
the back door. It has been suggested, for example, that actual bias renders
the proceedings void ab initio and cannot be waived, while a reasonable

apprehension of bias can be waived.4 1

38. For an example of the application of the waiver doctrine in the face of a finding of reasonable
apprehension of bias, see Fletcherv Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)2008 FC 909,
[2008] 74 Imm LR (3d) 78. For an academic treatment of this issue, see David Mullan & Martha
Boyle, "Raising and Dealing with Issues of Bias and Disclosure" (2004) 18 Can JAdmin L & Prac 37
at 40-48. For necessity see, The Judges v Attorney General ofSaskatchewan, [1936] 4 DLR 134 (Sask
CA), aff'd [1937] 2 DLR 209 (JCPC); and R v Campbell, [1998] 1 SCR 3 at paras 4-8.
39. See the discussion of the procedural issues arising from the waiver doctrine in "Legal Principles,"
supra note 7, at 589-91; Geoffrey Lester, "Disqualifying Judges," supranote 11 at 337.
40. Fundy Linen Service Inc v Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission, 2009
NBCA 13, 308 DLR (4th) 53 at paras 19 and 21.
41. See the suggestion made by counsel to the court in Ziindel v Canadian Human Rights
Commission, [1999] 3 FC 58 at para 16. Reed J did not find it necessary to rule on the question because
she concluded: "There is no evidence before me that demonstrates the existence of any actual bias."
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Similarly, the doctrine of necessity is not well integrated into the
overall doctrinal scheme of judicial disqualification.4 2 If our sole concern
is whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists, it is not clear how a
taint affecting all members of a court would make the reasonable person
more rather than less accepting of a judgment so tainted. As the Supreme
Court of Canada observed in R v Campbell: "The law recognizes that in
some situations a judge who is not impartial and independent is preferable
to no judge at all."4 3 In our view, the justification for the necessity doctrine
is not that it is impossible to imagine a way in which our system of justice
could be modified to find an adjudicator who does not have a material
interest in the dispute. Rather, the explanation is that we do not consider it
appropriate to require the justice system to allocate adjudicative authority
to another body in the relatively rare instances in which all judges have the
same type of financial itnerest in the outcome of the dispute.
Some of the difficulties that judges encounter in the application of the
reasonable apprehension of bias test go beyond the framing of the test. In
our research, we found that provincial and territorial court judges showed
significant variability in their application of the test depending on the
context in which the test was being applied." Also, some judges appeared
to favour not sitting when a party objected, while others emphasized
their duty to sit barring a legal requirement to recuse." Again, it became
apparent that factors that were not part of the formulation of the test played
an important role. That said, no single factor allowed us to predict how a
judge would approach any given situation. 46 What became evident is that
recusal is a complex phenomenon and there is no simple explanation for
the variation.
In our study, we identified five considerations that seemed to us to be
likely candidates to have at least some influence on the different responses
or otherwise explain the information we received through the survey.
The first was the different assessments judges made of the practical
implications for the efficient administration of justice of their willingness
to recuse themselves in different types of situations. The second was the
extent to which judges perceived that parties were raising recusal in order
to gain a tactical advantage rather than as the result of a genuine concern
about the presence of a reasonable apprehension of bias. The third was the
42. For a useful discussion of the necessity doctrine, see Richard Tracey, "Disqualified Adjudicators:
The Doctrine of Necessity in Public Law" (1982) Public Law 628.
43. Campbell, supra note 38 at para 4.
44. See Bryden & Hughes, "Tip of the Iceberg," supra note 3 at 583-595.
45. Ibid at 604-608.
46. Ibid at 596.
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extent to which judges were influenced by a sense that they should be more
willing to recuse themselves where the outcome of the dispute is of greater
significance to the parties than they should in situations where the stakes
are lower. The fourth was the extent to which judges were, or were not,
aware of the common practice of their colleagues. And the fifth, as noted
above,4 7 was that some judges tended to avoid situations in which a party
would prefer to have the matter adjudicated by a different judge, at least
where there was no compelling reason not to do so. Other judges tended
to emphasize their obligation to sit except where the law clearly requires
that they do not do so. These factors had varying strength depending on the
scenario to which the test was being applied.48
The first three factors are connected to the test in that they also relate
to the efficiency and good reputation of the justice system. Bias is not the
only possible taint to a justice system. Delay, permitting parties to game
the system, and disproportionate process all have the potential to affect
the reputation of the courts and the justice system as a whole. The fourth
factor relates to the efficiency and good reputation of the justice system in
a slightly different way. Because most recusal decisions are made on the
judge's own initiative and without notice, consultation, or reasons, it is not
surprising that judges are less aware oftheir colleagues' practice in this area
of the law compared to areas that consistently generate jurisprudence. This
issue cannot be addressed effectively in the formulation of the test, but, as
will be discussed below, may be susceptible to improvement through the
articulation of bright line rules in the context of judicial ethics codes and
through judicial education. The fifth factor, varying degrees of sensitivity
to the perceptions of the parties, may not be resolved conclusively by the
modification of the test we propose below, but at least this modification
has the potential to make this factor more transparent and open to debate.
IV. An adjusted version of the reasonable apprehensionof bias test
As we have seen, while there are considerable advantages in the way the
reasonable apprehension of bias test is framed, a number of difficulties
arise that might warrant some refinement of the test. Rather than
determining only whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists, we
would argue that the test should expressly address some of the hidden
factors that already inform recusal practice. In our view, understanding
judicial disqualification as requiring a balancing of the various factors that
would likely affect the reputation of the justice system such as bias and

47.
48.

See text at supranote 45.
Bryden & Hughes, "Tip of the Iceberg," supra note 3 at 597-608.
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efficiency considerations, would bring greater clarity to the test and would
promote more consistent application without sacrificing the advantages
of the unified test. We therefore propose the following italicized text be
added to Mr. Justice de Grandprd's classic formulation of the reasonable
apprehension of bias test:
...the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable
and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and
obtaining thereon the required information. ...In determining whether
or not an apprehension of bias is reasonable,a court should balance
the objective circumstancesgiving rise to the apprehensionof bias with
explicit considerationofthe effect ofthe recusaldecision on the reputation
of the justice system and its effective and efficient administration.

Under this test, factors favouring recusal would include that the
apprehension of bias arises in the context of litigation with a high impact
on the party/parties (e.g., criminal cases, civil disputes that have very high
human stakes, such as child apprehension and custody litigation); the fact
that there would be no or only minimal delay occasioned by the recusal;
that the recusal does not result in a tactical advantage; or, more generally,
that a recusal would have a low impact on the efficient administration
of justice. Conversely, factors that would suggest a duty to sit would
include long delays resulting from the recusal, the fact that recusal would
clearly favour one side to the dispute, a perception of tactical use of a
recusal motion, a high impact on efficient administration of justice, or a
comparatively low stakes case.
There are, of course, situations where the bias concerns would
inevitably overwhelm other considerations. These would at a minimum
include situations where the judge is subjectively unsure of his or her
ability to be impartial. As well, where binding precedent requires the
recusal of a judge, the refined test would still require recusal.
Bringing an express multi-factor balancing test to analytically marginal
cases has several advantages:
1. By requiring articulation, the relative strength of the (currently)
hidden factors as compared to the bias concern would become overt,
rationalized, and less impressionistic. Hidden reasoning creates
inconsistency and uncertainty. Hidden reasoning related to the efficient
administration of justice in instances of hidden cases of recusals
propriomotu would likely exaggerate this effect.
2.

The insider concerns of the justice system would no longer have to
be artificially attributed to the reasonable person. This has a number
of advantages. First, the reasonable person of the bias test would
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more strongly resemble reasonable person tests in other parts of the
law. This reasonable person could keep their focus firmly on the
reputational impact of the bias concern. Second, it would allow judges
who thought they should sit because recusal would implicate one or
more of the factors militating in favour of a duty to sit to articulate this
as part of their reasons. Third, appellate treatment of a refusal to recuse
for reasons on the other side of the scales would no longer result in
an implication that a judge was "unreasonable" merely because they
felt that they had a duty to sit. Instead, an appeal court that wanted to
disagree could simply state that it preferred the balance to be struck
differently-a much more palatable and appropriate outcome.
3. The proposed test would rationalize the current categorical approach.
As we noted above,4 9 the current test is applied with varying strictness
depending on the category or nature of the alleged bias. The test is
applied very strictly in cases involving a direct financial interest,
even where the amounts are quite small. It is applied much more
leniently in cases where the alleged bias relates to a prior professional
relationship or where extra-judicial statements might be taken as
disclosing an opinion or a preference. Bias cases involving social
rather than professional relationships tend to fall somewhere in the
middle." Rather than applying the test strictly in low-frequency cases
(e.g., direct financial interest) and leniently in high-frequency cases
(e.g., statements tending to disclose views), the test itself would reflect
these factors. This is because balancing the bias concern against the
efficient administration would reflect the frequency difference. This, it
might be hoped, would lead to a more integrated jurisprudence.
4. The exceptions fit better into the doctrinal framework. Informed
waiver is indicative of a (reasonable) perception by the parties that
proceeding with the assigned adjudicator is consistent with the
effective, efficient, and respectable administration of justice. The
waiving party would not be sending a signal that they don't care about
impartial adjudication; rather, the waiver would suggest that the, now
express, competing considerations simply outweigh the potential bias
concern. In a similar vein, the doctrine of necessity would no longer
be an unconnected exception. Instead, it would represent the end of
a spectrum, where for practical administration of justice reasons, no
effect can be given to the bias concern.

49.
50.

See the text at notes 34-35 above.
See Bryden, "Legal Principles," supra note 7 at 580-583.
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5. The modified test makes it easier to explain the extensive line of
authority that indicates that the experiences judges bring to judicial
office cannot normally be used as a basis for a challenge that the judge
for lacks impartiality." The rationale for these decisions is not that
it is unreasonable for litigants or members of the public to believe
that a judge's life experience will influence his or her outlook on
a case. Rather, the rationale is that it is inevitable that a system of
justice that relies on appointed judges as opposed to judges who are
selected by the parties will occasionally bring forward judges whose
life experience and initial perspective on a case is likely to be more
favourable to one party than to another. This is a reason for the judge
to be particularly assiduous in ensuring that he or she is weighing the
evidence and arguments as impartially as possible, but in our view it
would not enhance the reputation of our justice system if the law made
this type of consideration a basis for judicial disqualification.
In sum, rendering visible the hidden factors that currently influence
recusal practice in the shadows of the reasonable apprehension of bias
test would lead to greater doctrinal coherence and to more certainty of
application.
V. Assisting with the application of the test
In addition to our suggestion regarding the substantive test itself, we
believe it is useful to make a few observations about both the standard
of review to be used in assessing first instance decisions and a number
of procedural changes that could facilitate first instance decision-making.
On balance, we are of the view that the choice of the appropriate balance
among competing interests militating in favour of sitting as opposed to
disqualification should be understood as a question of law that would be
reviewed using a "correctness" standard rather than a question of mixed
fact and law or an exercise of discretion that would be reviewed using
a more deferential "reasonableness" standard. This view is favoured by
precedent, policy, and principle. In addition to running contrary to the widely
(albeit not universally) held assumption that constitutional and procedural
fairness issues should be reviewed using the correctness standard, 2 the
disadvantage of reasonableness review is that appellate judges will always
want to interfere with some decisions and when they do, the specter of the
51. See, for example, R v RDS, supra note 1; Arsenault-Cameronv Prince Edward Island, [1995] 3
SCR 851, and the cases discussed in Bryden, "Legal Principles," supranote 7 at 587-589.
52. See David Jones & Anne de Villars, PrinciplesofAdministrativeLaw, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell,
2009) at 572-576; Donald Brown & Hon John Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action
(Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 2012) at §7:1610 and §14:4211.
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"unreasonable" first instance decision-maker once again looms its ugly
head. Further, a correctness standard is consistent with the view that, since
judicial impartiality is both a constitutional imperative and a requirement
of procedural fairness, both litigants and members of the judiciary would
benefit from authoritative appellate guidance rather than general appellate
supervision with respect to the striking of this balance. That said, we
acknowledge that the advantage of reasonableness review would be that
it recognizes that striking an appropriate balance is a nuanced and factsensitive task and that trial judges (or administrative tribunals) may benefit
from having some leeway in their margin of appreciation of the relevant
considerations. In theory, it could also lead to trial judges and tribunal
members having more confidence in their ability to sit in marginal cases,
which may be a good thing for the justice system overall. We are ultimately
not persuaded, however, that these pragmatic considerations outweigh the
advantages we have identified for using the correctness standard.
With respect to questions of procedure, our study revealed that judges
currently under-utilize some of the already available mechanisms for
improving recusal decisions. As indicated, most judges recuse of their own
motion without consulting either the parties or otherjudges. Consulting the
parties can be tricky. On a variety of occasions when we have discussed
recusal and disqualification issues with judges we have found that a
number of judges expressed the concern that advising the parties of facts
that, in the judge's mind, did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias was simply asking for trouble. Conversely, where the facts were
closer to the line, disclosure might be seen as fishing for a waiver. In our
view, if the facts are sufficiently relevant to be on the judge's mind, they
probably warrant consultation of some kind, unless the facts are such that
the judge has already decided that he or she will recuse. The reformulated
test ought to assistjudges in framing the disclosure more neutrally as both
sides of the equation are now expressly part of the analysis.
Generally, more jurisprudence would be very desirable. The current
reported case law is heavily tilted toward those situations where a party
formally (and unsuccessfully) moves for recusal. As indicated, these cases
are exceptional, both from a procedural and from a substantive viewpoint.
This results in a jurisprudence that is not only unrepresentative of the
overall picture, but also offers limited assistance to judges who have to
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decide whether or not to sit in relatively common marginal situations." If
some more clear cases were reported and the scope of recusal were better
understood, it would help both parties and judges appreciate how bias may
manifest as well as the actual impacts of recusals on the administration
of justice. Another tool that is under-utilized is pro-active rule making.
There are few bright-line rules about recusal. In the area of professional
relationships, an area that is particularly troubling to many judges, all
jurisdictions should promulgate rules regarding cooling-off periods for
both former firms and former clients (on unrelated matters). Other areas
that would benefit from bright-line rules relate to prior proceedings,
particularly related proceedings. It should be made clear that a judge who
was involved in a bail hearing may (or may not) hear the trial. Ajudge who
imposed conditions as part of a criminal sentence may (or even should)
hear any breach proceeding. Another area suitable for bright-line rules is
involvement in case management. These are matters of such frequency
that neither litigants nor the bench should be in any doubt about acceptable
practices.
Finally, it would also be desirable to include procedural rules for recusal
motions in the various rules of court. In particular, we think that it would
be useful to give a judge the explicit discretion to refer a recusal motion
to another judge, as has been suggested by a number of Australian judges
including former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Sir Anthony
Mason.5 4 There will often be circumstances in which it is appropriate
for a judge to make a decision with respect to recusal personally, either
because the judge is concerned about his or her subjective capacity to act
impartially in the circumstances of a particular case or more commonly
because referring the matter to another judge would cause unjustifiable
delay. On the other hand, we believe that there may be circumstances
in which it would serve the interests of both the parties and the judge
if the balancing of interests that we describe in our revised "reasonable
53. Once again, it is worth noting that some American commentators suggest that the recusal
jurisprudence in that country is skewed by a tendency for the reported decisions to come
disproportionately from judges who are seeking to justify their unwillingness to recuse, perhaps in
situations in which they should not sit, see supra note 23. This is based on the observation that judges
who are inclined to recuse are likely to do so on their own motion and without written reasons. Thus,
the jurisprudence is dominated by those judges who are reluctant to recuse. Our research concerning
Canadian judges suggests that there are outlying views at both ends of the spectrum of willingness
to recuse. See Bryden & Hughes, "Tip of the Iceberg," supra note 3 at 604-608. Our impression
is that in Canada, the open-ended character of the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test and the
paucity of jurisprudence providing authoritative guidance in relatively common marginal situations
often encourages judges to be more willing to recuse themselves than would be advisable in the best
interests of the effective administration ofjustice.
54. Mason, supra note 24.
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apprehension of bias test" could be done by a different judge than the one
who has been assigned to try the case.
Conclusion
The "reasonable apprehension of bias" test forjudicial disqualification has
been used in one form or another throughout the common law world for
a very long time. Its success is derived from its substantial advantages in
focusing our attention on the importance of maintaining public confidence
in the impartiality of judges and on making an objective assessment of
whether the circumstances would warrant a reasonable observer to lose
confidence in the appearance that the judge was impartial. On the other
hand, our research has indicated that the test does not offer determinative
guidance to judges in marginal cases, and that some of the techniques
used to assist judges in their efforts to take into account the impact of
recusal in marginal cases on the effective administration ofjustice are less
than helpful. As a result, we propose a refinement of the test that calls
for explicit consideration and balancing of the reasons why recusal might
be warranted with the impact of recusal on the effective, efficient and
reputable administration of justice. It is our hope that this refinement will
preserve the virtues of the basic test while enhancing the development of a
jurisprudence that more effectively explains why recusal or disqualification
is warranted in one marginal situation and not in another.

